The Ethics of Terrorism and Revolution

Ted Goertzel

Reprinted from Terrorism:  An International Journal, Volume 11, pp. 1-12, 1988.

Note:  This paper is available as a Microsoft Word file that retains the original pagination for purposes of citations.  I have added a few hyperlinks to this version, but I have not otherwise updated it.
 

Abstract Does the fact that one side's "terrorist" is usually another's "freedom fighter" mean that there is no possibility of agreeing on ethical norms applicable to armed conflicts between governments and their opponents? There are no easy answers. We cannot simply condemn all violence against established governments; surely, the Jews of the Warsaw ghetto were right to defend themselves. Nor can we accept the cynical view that ethical judgments are irrelevant, that violence is justified when it succeeds, that might makes right. This view is morally repugnant and impractical. In practice, we must make judgments before we know which actions will succeed and which will fail.

In today's world, governments and revolutionary movements frequently seek approval and support from deliberative bodies which claim to uphold ethical standards. Debates in the United States Congress about supporting anti-Sandinista rebels and debates at the United Nations about the Middle East, Ireland, Puerto Rico, and various African struggles frequently raise the question of the legitimacy of revolutionary/terrorist violence. Some revolutionary movements, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization and the African National Congress, have been given official diplomatic status and have accepted, in principle, an obligation to act within international law.

Gradually, the world community is working toward a set of ethical standards for revolutionary conflicts. To be successful, these standards must be acceptable to people whose thinking about ethical issues is based on very different historical experiences and philosophical traditions. In particular, they must deal with the issues raised by Marxist as well as non-Marxist ethical thinking.

Marxist Ethics

Marxists have often disdained moral arguments as idealist and irrelevant in a world where. political and intellectual developments are determined by underlying material forces. Ethical theories and other ideas are viewed as ideologies which are means to ends. Those ideas which advance the end of socialist revolution are good; those which do not are useless or harmful. Ethically, the assumption here is that the ends justify the means--whatever works is good.

Despite its apparent simplicity, this ethical theory is difficult to use as a guide to practice since Marxists have been no more successful than anyone else in predicting which revolutionary movements will succeed. Nor have they been able to show that successful revolutions have been inevitable, instead of resulting from deliberate actions by leaders such as Lenin, Mao, and Castro. Even the most orthodox philosophical materialists, who believe that all choices are causally determined, must, in practice, deliberate and make decisions based on imperfect knowledge. In so doing, they make ethical judgments, even if they don't wish to acknowledge that that is what they are doing. In the revolutionary euphoria of the 1960s and early 1970s, it was not difficult for Marxist philosophers of revolution to concede these points. Herbert Marcuse and Jesse McDade argued that, for a revolutionary movement to be ethical, there must be a realistic expectation of success, not just in seizing power but in advancing human freedom and happiness.1 W.H. Nielsen argued that revolutions are morally justified if they save more lives from starvation and disease than they cost.2 Today, however, the Latin American revolutions which they advocated have largely failed, and the possibilities for non-revolutionary economic development and political democratization have proved greater than anticipated. And the Marxist revolutions which have succeeded in winning power, such as in Cambodia, have sometimes led to greater suffering than would have occurred without a revolution. Their ethical points remain valid, but applying them to real-world situations is more problematic than it seemed at the time when they were made.

Non-Marxist Ethics

The Western nations do not have a single dominant philosophical theory with a role equivalent to that of historical materialism in the Soviet bloc.3 We can, however, distinguish two major traditions within Western ethical thought: absolutist theories, which stress binding moral duties, and utilitarian or consequentialist theories, which argue that behavior is right if it maximizes the general welfare. These approaches can be synthesized into perspectives such as rule utilitarianism that argue that we should follow those rules which would maximize the general welfare if everyone followed them, even though they may not appear to do so in a particular instance. A major weakness of utilitarian theories is that they may maximize the general welfare at the expense of minorities. Theories of justice try to resolve this problem.

To the extent that Marxism has well-defined ethical principles, they fall within the utilitarian tradition. Marxists assert that the best way to assure the greatest good for the greatest number is to give power to a party committed to Marxist principles. Liberal utilitarians accept the goal but argue that it can better be accomplished with liberal reformism. Absolutist theories, on the other hand, assert that there are principles which are more fundamental than maximizing the general welfare. They challenge Marxism on fundamental principles, while consequentialist theories challenge it on empirical grounds.

Utilitarian Theories of Revolution

Liberals have often been frustrated with Marxists who assume that their theory gives them easy answers to ethical questions. Leon Trotsky, for example, asserted that:

A means can be justified only by its end. But the end in turn needs to be justified. From the Marxist point of view, which expresses the historic interests of the proletariat, the end is justified if it leads to increasing the power of man over nature and to the abolition of the power of man over man.4 Yet, as John Dewey argued in response to Trotsky, revolutionary Marxists rarely make the kind of analysis which this ethical position requires. In his classic History of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky raises the question of whether the revolution was worth while but dismisses the question as "theological and therefore fruitless," asserting that we might as well ask, "in the face of the difficulties and griefs of personal existence: is it worth while to be born. "6

This is hardly convincing. If we accept Trotsky's own historical account, Russian history would have been quite different if Lenin had chosen to spend the war years in Switzerland. In their accounts of the Soviet experience, Marxists very seldom seriously consider whether the tremendous loss of life in the collectivization process, to say nothing of the revolution itself, can be justified by the social gains since the revolution.7Excess mortality in the Soviet Union has been conservatively estimated at 4 to 5 million  during the years 1929-1939 when the Soviets were firmly in control.8 Whatever the precise numbers, the very high loss of life in the major world revolutions places a great burden of proof on revolutionaries who claim to be advancing the common good. Liberal scholars who have tried to compare the. accomplishments of countries which have had Marxist revolutions with similar ones which have not have often reached ambivalent conclusions. Rhoads Murphey's comparison of the Chinese and Indian development records concludes that both countries have been about equally successful in advancing the well-being of their citizens.9 A study published by the Council on Foreign Relations, after a careful analysis of the full range of human rights' conditions in both countries, could not decide whether, on balance, things are better in Cuba or in Mexico.10

In Marx's time, socialism was generally understood to be a system where production and distribution of goods would be based on need. This presented a clear argument for moral superiority over capitalist societies, which were based on greed-the profit motive.  In the late twentieth century, however, these metaphysical arguments have been  replaced by sociological comparisons of existing social systems. In this process, the distinction between capitalism and socialism has blurred. Even the Chinese and the Cubans have turned to systems depending on material incentives after they found that production suffered under systems of equal rewards.11 The more progressive capitalist countries, on the other hand, have welfare and labor laws which eliminate the worst excesses of the profit system. A consensus seems to be emerging that a mixed economy, with a combination of market incentives and government regulation, is most successful in advancing the general welfare. Revolutionary violence is not usually necessary to bring about such a system.

Absolutist Theories of Revolution

Despite the difficulty of justifying revolutions on utilitarian grounds, the right to revolution is widely accepted by liberals as well as radicals. Although revolution is inherently extra-legal, the right to revolution is recognized in both international law and in American,  Greek, Roman, French, German, and medieval European legal traditions, in part because many governments base their legitimacy on a revolutionary past.12 This liberal defense of the right to revolution is based on the principle that people have the right to make their own decisions, regardless of any objective analysis of theconsequences. This principle of respect for persons was first enunciated in Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. 13 Kant thought that a rational being would always treat any other rational being as he would treat himself; otherwise, he would be logically inconsistent. People should be treated as ends in themselves, not as a means only. Each individual's preferences and judgments must be considered just as important as those of anyone else, including people in authority positions.

It is very difficult, however, to apply the principle of respect for persons to a situation where people must be treated as part of a group, class, or category. Social changes, whether revolutionary or reformist, affect thousands of individuals, many of whom may not know that the change is taking place. Many citizens are poorly informed or uninterested in public issues and may not be qualified to make an informed judgment. It is clearly impossible to delay social changes until each and every individual agrees to the changes. Nor could a respect for persons logically require this, since not changing fails to  respect the wishes of those who do want the change.

The usual liberal solution to this problem is to require majority consent, on the argument that this respects the wishes of as many people as possible. Thus, Lincoln's defense of the right to revolution was delivered together with a denial of the right of a minority to secede. Revolutionaries also frequently justify their actions with the claim that they havemajority support. Somerville argued that:

It is perhaps important to emphasize that the predominant weight and content
of the Marxist philosophy is explicitly against the undertaking of any violent
revolution which is opposed by the majority and which is not likely to enlist
the support of the masses. In other words, there must be convincing evidence
that the majority are in support of so drastic a step, and that they are prepared
to face the dangers involved in their active cooperation in carrying it out.14
Free elections are the only viable mechanism for allowing the majority of the population of a country to make its own decisions. Despite the many limitations of the bourgeois electoral process, Marxists have generally recognized that people are unlikely to resort to revolution when they have the option of expressing their will through the electoral process.  Che Guevara, for example, lost his life in a revolutionary struggle which violated his own warning: Where a government has come to power through some form of popular vote,
fraudulent or not, it is impossible to produce a guerrilla outbreak because all
of the possibilities of civic struggle have not been exhausted. 15
Ethnic Revolutions

While their reasons would differ, Marxists and liberals might agree that revolutionary movements are not justified in societies where people have the right to choose their leaders through elections in which all parties are free to participate. A strong objection to the principle of majority support, however, could be raised by those who speak on behalf of oppressed minority groups. Clearly, an ethnic group need not be a majority within a larger territorial unit for revolutionary movements to be morally justified, particularly in the face of genocidal attacks. Often, ethnic conflict aims at changing political boundaries, with the goal of making a minority group a majority within a redefined geographic area.

Questions of minority and majority are part of the problem, not the solution, in places such as Ireland, Nigeria (Biafra), and Israel (Palestine). Since 1945, the right of self-determination has been strongly supported by the United Nations when applied to Third World colonies of European powers. Indeed, the General Assembly has resolved that: " . . colonial peoples have the inherent right to struggle by all necessary means at their disposal against colonial Powers and alien domination in exercise of their right of self-determination." 16 The General Assembly further determined that Israel was a racist and colonial power, implying that the activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization were legitimate under this resolution. International law, however, is generally negative about secessionist movements, since it reflects the interests of established governments.l7 The U.N. and regional groups such as the Organization of African Unity have generally not recognized the right of self-determination when applied to minority populations within member states. The principles which underlie these decisions are more political than ethical. The Palestinians are supported because of the political strength of the Arab delegations, the Biafrans are opposed because of the fear of setting a precedent which might threaten all African states. Clearly, the world community needs better guidelines for resolving these issues.

Ved Nanda argued that claims to the right to secede should be evaluated according to the extent to which a group suffers subjugation and oppression and individual members of the group are denied the right of equal participation in the society.18 Also, the extent to which the secession would threaten the rights of the members of the larger entity must be considered. 19 These arguments are based partly on utilitarian criteria, but they do consider respect for persons since subjugation, oppression, and denial of civil rights violate that respect. A key test is the extent to which members of a racial or ethnic minority are denied equal rights to participate as individuals in the full range of socially valued activities: economic, political, religious, intellectual, and so on.

No procedure other than free and genuine elections is available to permit large groups of people to make their own political decisions. And while elections and plebiscites can certainly be conducted among members of minority groups, there is no way to guarantee that they not be outvoted without compromising the rights of the majority. Of course, no group is guaranteed the right to win any one election, and inherent in the electoral process is the right to try again in the next regular election, perhaps in alliance with different groups or factions. At a minimum, the principle of respect for persons requires that all groups be given a fair opportunity to participate in this ongoing process.

The denial of political rights on racial grounds is the key element behind the growing international consensus that South Africa's institutions are ethically reprehensible. The facts that South African blacks are better off economically than blacks in black-ruled African countries or that political rights are often denied in these countries on non-racial grounds do not carry much weight. Even the genocide of hundreds of thousands of blacks by other blacks in Burundi and Uganda received much less world attention.20

Despite Marxist cynicism about formally free multi-party elections, such elections do have considerable international legitimacy. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees "the freedom of peaceful assembly and association," asserts that the will of the people shall be expressed in "free and genuine elections," and recognizes that people may as a last resort have recourse to "rebellion against tyranny and oppression. "21 Despite problems with ratification and enforcement, the Declaration has been recognized as binding international law in several international treaties.22 The Proclamation of Teheran,ratified by both the Western and Soviet bloc nations, explicitly recognizes that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a statement of binding moral duties accepted by the world community:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states a common understanding
of the people of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of
all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for the
members of the international community .23
The fact that the principle of free and genuine elections carries some weight with international public opinion is demonstrated by recent events in Central America. In both Nicaragua and El Salvador, the governments have argued that the revolutionary movements opposing them are illegitimate because the electoral option was available to them. And in both cases, the opponents of the governments have gone to great lengths to subvert the electoral process and deny its legitimacy. In both cases, international observers were used to try to maximize the legitimacy of the elections in world public opinion. There is wide international consensus on the principle that armed political struggle is not legitimate when opposition groups are free to organize and campaign effectively in free elections. These elections must permit all political, ideological, and social groups the freedom to organize freely and to have access to the public through modern media of communication.
One-party elections, or elections in which some parties are banned from participation or some groups are denied the right to vote, clearly do not have any legitimacy in resolving situations of conflict. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, the opposition claimed that the elections were invalid because they were denied the opportunity to campaign freely and safely.

International Law and Civil Warfare

While the great historical revolutions were massive upheavals which were completed within a year or two, today's world is characterized by prolonged conflicts which occasionally flare up into major crises. These conflicts are sustained by small groups undertaking clandestine violent actions. The participants in these acts see themselves as the vanguard of a glorious revolutionary movement, while the authorities define them as criminal terrorists lacking in moral worth. When conflicts last for decades, it is difficult to define the revolution as an exceptional circumstance which justifies behavior which would be unacceptable under normal conditions.

On an international scale, also, the distinction between war and peace has become less sharp, as wars are increasingly undeclared and often fought through proxy forces. These changes have posed difficult problems for international law, which developed in an era when wars were formally declared between sovereign nations. During World War II, the Nazis maintained a clear distinction between enemy soldiers, who were treated according to recognized international standards when taken prisoner, and resistance fighters in occupied nations, who were usually executed. This corresponded to international law at the time, which recognized irregular fighters as legitimate only when they were part of the military effort of a power which had not surrendered. In response to the Nazi atrocities, the Geneva Conferences of 1949 extended certain protections to participants in armed conflicts which are not international in character. 24 Article 3 of all four conventions signed at the time prohibits violence, cruelty, and torture against individuals who are taking no active part in hostilities, including members of armed units who have surrendered. The taking of hostages is also prohibited. Unlike international warfare, the execution of prisoners is permitted, but only after proper judgment by a regularly constituted court.

The legal protections are much less than those extended to soldiers in conventional international conflicts, but they do place some humane limits on civil conflicts. They apply to both parties of the conflict, but there is some question about who is to be treated as a legitimate participant in a conflict. The laws of war generally require that combatants wear uniforms or other recognizable insignia and carry their arms openly. Combatants who dress in civilian clothing, and hide their arms, in order to enjoy the protection of civilian status, may not be given official prisoner-of-war status when captured.

Particularly in the early stages of a conflict, revolutionary movements are usually much weaker than the government forces opposing them. Their advantages are those of stealth and surprise, and they hide from government forces either by camping in remote areas or by living among the civilian population. This gives government forces an incentive to kill or forcibly relocate civilians, in order to destroy the revolutionaries' base, even to the extent of defoliating and depopulating large rural areas.

Guerrilla fighters also find it much easier to attack unprotected civilians rather than military units. A very small group of people can hijack a civilian airplane or set off a bomb in a crowded cafe. The taking of hostages is sometimes productive in winning concessions such as the release of prisoners and, thus, might seem justifiable on utilitarian grounds, particularly if the threat to kill innocent civilians is not carried out. However, no government will permit its vital interests to be compromised in this way, even if this means allowing the hostages to be killed. Terrorist bombings of civilian targets have never proved more than an irritant to a well-entrenched population which is protected by effective security forces. They do serve to increase the level of hostility and weaken the influence of moderate forces on both sides of a conflict which might be inclined to find a peaceful settlement. Certainly, no one can rationally expect that the Israelis will be driven out of Palestine by these tactics. Even in Northern Ireland, where the English might easily be persuaded to leave, Lee argues that terrorism has been counterproductive.25

These terrorist acts are clearly prohibited by international law, even if they are committed by regular military forces during a formally declared war. Assassinations of unarmed political leaders are also illegal. While recognized governments do engage in these acts, they cannot legally claim prisoner-of-war status for personnel who are apprehended while committing them, and perpetrators are sometimes prosecuted for war crimes.

Legally, a distinction is drawn between killing civilians as an unintended consequence of military action and deliberate killing of civilians. This is important as an expression of respect for persons. From a Kantian perspective, the acts of Palestinian or Christian guerrillas who deliberately kill nursery school children are especially repugnant, even though the utilitarian could point out that Israeli bombers or American warships may actually kill many more children without requiring the pilots or sailors to intend to do so.

Modern military technology allows the representatives of powerful states to kill large numbers of innocent people, while maintaining a sense of smug superiority over the guerrilla who can only kill in a less impersonal way. The key ethical distinction, how ever, is the intention of the actor, not the extent to which the action can be carried out impersonally with modern technology. By this perspective, the common practice during World War II of bombing civilian targets which had no military importance, in attempts to compel the leaders on the other side to give up, is morally unacceptable. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, cities with no real military importance, was justified with a utilitarian argument that more lives would have been lost in an invasion. As is often the case with this kind of argument, no real calculation of the number of lives saved was made, and a greatly inflated estimate was widely accepted.26

If one relies solely on utilitarian criteria, it is hard to keep from sliding into a position where anything is justified if the goal is good. Kantian absolutes, in the form of prohibitions such as "thou shah not murder innocent civilians," do place some moral limits on the horrors of war and revolution and, thus, hold out the hope that the participants on both sides are honorable people with whom a future settlement might be reached. Adherence to such standards provides a meaningful distinction between revolutionaries and terrorists. Of course, these rules must prohibit bombing of civilian targets by planes and warships as well as attacks on civilians by guerrilla groups. The fact that soldiers on both sides of conventional wars have viewed each other as honorable combatants has facilitated the reestablishment of peaceful relations after the wars have ended. Adherence toethical standards in revolutionary or civil warfare, also, could facilitate eventual settlements.

The International Committee of the Red Cross sponsored a Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts, which met in Geneva from 1972 to 1976.27 The pact which concluded this conference was signed by the Carter administration, but the Reagan administration has raised objections about ratification in part because the treaty would grant rights to forces such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization if they were certified by regional bodies.28 Adherence to the Geneva Convention by the P.L.O. would, of course, require that they also abide by the rules of war. In fact, the P.L.O. has publicly condemned violence against unarmed civilians and has pledged to limit armed activities to Israeli-occupied territory. Governments engaged in conflicts with revolutionary groups are generally unwilling to grant them the legitimacy and recognition implied by adherence to such treaties, and they may have reasonable doubts about the willingness or ability of such groups to uphold its agreements. Nevertheless, on 9 December 1985, Israel joined with all other U.N. member states in supporting a resolution condemning acts of terrorism against unarmed civilians, a resolution which was commended by the P.L.O. spokesman as "a historic landmark in the endeavor of the United Nations to put an end to criminal acts of terrorism."29

While objections can be raised about particular legal provisions in each agreement, the Geneva Conventions do provide an international ethical code distinguishing between moral and immoral behavior in armed conflicts. Even if parties to a conflict are not willing to recognize each other formally, adherence to the fundamental principles which underlie the Geneva Conventions should be accepted as an ethical responsibility. This responsibility is based on fundamental ethical principles and does not depend on an equal adherence by the other side to the conflict.

Conclusions

There are two distinct questions: When is it justified to make a revolution, and, once a conflict has begun, what rules should be followed in conducting it? These same two questions apply to the law governing international conflicts, where the Latin terms jus ad bellum (the right to go to war) and jus in bello (the laws of war) are used. There is some legal ambiguity about how much of this law applies to civil conflicts.30 Civil wars have a great deal in common with international wars, however; and, on purely ethical grounds, it makes sense to use the same criteria in judging them insofar as this is possible. The laws of war are useful moral restraints in all kinds of conflicts. While the right to revolution clearly differs from the right to go to war in significant ways, there are also important similarities.

Among all the rights to revolution, the right of racial and ethnic groups to defend themselves against genocidal attacks is the most universally accepted. This right applies equally to groups which do or do not have their own nation state. Of course, members of a persecuted group may question the wisdom of violent resistance on practical grounds, if they believe that it would be ineffective or would only exacerbate the situation. But no one except absolute pacifists questions the fundamental right to self-defense. What is needed are more effective mechanisms for enforcing the international laws against genocide. The indifference of world opinion to the genocides which have taken place in the last decades is shocking.

There is also a great deal of consensus about the right of racial and ethnic minorities to resort to armed struggle if they are denied equal participation in political and social life. The argument for this right on utilitarian grounds is much more ambiguous than the argument for the right of defense against genocide, but international support for it has been much stronger, at least with regard to Palestine and South Africa. The right to equal participation does not mean a right to an independent national state, separate from other groups which inhabit the same or contiguous territory. Insofar as there is an international consensus on this issue, it is to respect existing national boundaries. Thus, existing states have a legal right to self-defense, but minority groups do not have a legal right to secede. Ethically, this distinction could be questioned, but there is no clear criterion for deciding which groups have a right to secede and which do not. The principle of respect for persons requires, however, that minorities which are not allowed to secede be allowed equal political rights within the existing state.

The right to revolution on behalf of oppressed social or economic groups can be defended only in situations where an electoral option is not open to these groups. This is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition and one which is difficult to apply in practice. In many situations, there are elections or promises of elections, but they are so corrupt or inadequate that oppressed groups question their usefulness. In these situations, a practical decision must be made as to whether an armed movement is likely to succeed, and whether, if successful, it will actually lead to a better political system. Many revolutionary movements have overthrown repressive regimes, only to end up by replacing them with something even worse. Stronger international pressures for democratic elections, and use of international observers in conducting them, has been helpful in avoiding this scenario in several countries in recent years. There is even a movement toward meaningful, multi-candidate elections in the Soviet-bloc countries.

While the right to revolution may never be recognized by both sides to a conflict, there is hope that both sides can agree to ethical limitations on the violence itself. The laws of war apply to the rules by which conflict is carried out, regardless of the origins of the disagreement. Ironically, the importance of the laws of war has been obscured partly by the influence of pacifist doctrines on Western social thought. In a provocative and thoughtful essay, Anscombe argued that by denouncing all killing, pacifism obscures the distinction between justifiable killing and murder. 31 Very few people are willing to adopt absolute pacifist principles, but this does not mean that there are no ethical limits on killing. The killing of unarmed civilians, or of prisoners of war, is not the same as killing in battle. This distinction is just as important in revolutionary conflicts as it is in traditional warfare.

Regardless of the legitimacy of their cause, revolutionary movements should establish ethical codes governing the conduct of their struggle. Insofar as possible, these standards should follow international laws governing warfare. If a revolutionary movement is too weak to attack military targets but can only place bombs on airplanes or gun down civilian bus passengers, then it is not ready for armed struggle. It can be argued, however, that the code for a guerrilla struggle should differ from that governing conventional warfare. Should people who are leaders of a repressive government, or torturers and murderers in the employ of that government, be exempt from attack in their civilian habitats, while ordinary conscript soldiers who follow the rules of war are fair game? Is a general a legitimate target when in uniform but not at home or on the golf course? Certainly, government forces are not likely to extend the same courtesy to guerrilla leaders. International law does allow combatants to consider "military necessity" in applying the laws of war. 32

The military necessities of a revolutionary conflict may differ from those of conventional warfare. Farer has argued that in civil conflicts a legitimate distinction can be made between "active participants in the struggle for power and the more or less passive bulk of the citizenry. "33 Such distinctions are difficult to make in practice, however, and the temptation to extend the list of legitimate victims is great. When revolutionary activists have been creative in their thinking, they have been able to conceive of many actions, such as destruction of torture centers, redistribution of hoarded wealth, freeing of prisoners, capture of weapons and supplies, or exposure of secret information which is embarrassing to the government, which are justifiable on the basis of their short-term benefits as well as making a contribution to the ultimate victory. Assassination of members of death squads or government security agencies might even be justified as self-defense. When a group resorts to killing minor government officials, selected because of their vulnerability, almost everyone agrees that it has gone too far. Certainly, the killing of health workers, farmers, store keepers, civilian managers, teachers, or social workers, to say nothing of pregnant women and school children, is beyond the bounds of any reasonable ethical code.

Groups which claim to be following ethical guidelines must establish good faith efforts to train their fighters in the laws of war. There must also be regular and effective procedures for ensuring that ethical guidelines are followed and for punishing violators. This is not unprecedented. To cite one recent example, in response to criticism of human rights' violations by the Nicaraguan contras, the United States government insisted that contra leaders set up such training programs. 34 Leaders of leftist revolutionary movements have long recognized the importance of strict discipline and prohibition of human rights' violations, if guerrillas are to win the popular support which is essential to their cause. Mao Tse-Tung, for example, exhorted his followers to "Oppose bandit ways, and uphold strict political discipline. "35 Strict adherence to modern ethical standards is a logical extension of this tradition. International support for revolutionary movements should depend on the extent to which ethical guidelines are actually observed in the course of the struggle, as well as on judgments about the justice of the cause itself.
 
Other Books and Articles by Ted Goertzel

Notes

1. Herbert Marcuse, "Ethics and Revolution," in Ethics and Society, ed. R. DeGeorge,

133-147 (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Jesse McDade, "The Ethicality of Revolution," Social

Praxis 1, 1973:291-298.

2. W.H. Nielsen, "Is Revolution Ever Morally Justified?" Journal of Value Inquiry 2, 1968:298-307.

3. See Paul Taylor, Principles of Ethics (Encino, Calif: Dickinson Publishing Co., 1975), for an overview of ethical theories. A good collection on the ethics of war is Marshal Cohen, Thomas Nagel, Thomas Scanlon, eds., War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

4. Leon Trotsky, Their Morals and Ours: Marxist vs. Liberal Views on Morality (New York: Pathfinder, 1969).

5. John Dewey, "Means and Ends," in Trotsky, ibid., 36.

6. Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1937), Vol. 3, 348-349.

7. A Marxist book which does tackle this question is Albert Szymanski, Human Rights in the Soviet Union (London: Zed Books, 1984). For a review, see Ted Goertzel, "A Polish-American Revolutionary in Europe and America," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 13 (1985):297-299. I

8. S.F. Wheatcroft, "A Note on Steven Rosefielde's Calculation of Excess Mortality in the USSR: 1929-1949," Soviet Studies 36 (1984):277-281.

I9. Rhoads Murphey, The Fading of the Maoist Vision (New York: Methuen, 1980).

10. Jorge Dominguez, Nigel Rooley, Bryce Wood, Richard Falk, Enhancing Global Human Rights (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).

11. Neville Maxwell and Brude McFarlane, eds., China's Changed Road to Development (Oxford: Pergammon, 1984); Arthur MacEwan, Revolution and Economic Development in Cuba (New York: St. Martin's, 1981).

12. Jordan J. Paust, "The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Forms of Social Violence," Emory Law Review 32 (1983):545-580; Gerald Sumida, "The Right of Revolution: Implications for International Law and World Order," in Power and Law, ed. Charles Berker, 130-167 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971).

13. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959 [1785].

14. John Somerville, The Philosophy of Marxism (New York: Random House, 1967), 124-125.

15. Chi Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Vintage, 1969).

16. Resolution on Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling against Colonial and Alien domination and Racist Regimes, United Resolution 3108 (XXVIII), cited in L.C. Green, "The Legalization of Terrorism," 175-197, in Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Boulder: Colorado: Westview, 1979). For a critical analysis, see Douglas J. Feith, "Law in the Service of Terror-The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol," The National Interest 1 (1985):36-47.

17. Ved Nanda, "The Validity of Claims to Secede," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 13 (1981):257-280.

18. Ibid.

19. Eisuke Suzuki, "Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Responses to Territorial Separation," Virginia Journal of International Law 16 (1976):779-862.

20. Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University, 1982).

21. General Assembly Resolution 217A, U.N. Document A/810, 1948.

22. Bruno Bitker, "The United States and International Codification of Human Rights: A Case of Split Personality," in The Dynamics of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Natalie Hevener, 77-100 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981).

23. Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Publication No. E.68.XLV.2, 1968.

24. G.LA.D. Draper, The Red Cross Conventions (New York: Pathfinder, 1969).

25. Alfred McClung Lee, Terrorism an Northern Ireland (New York: General Hall, 1983).

26. Rufus Miles, "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million Lives Saved," International Security 9 (Fall, 1985):120-140.

27. Tom Farer, "The Laws of War 25 Years after Nuremburg," International Consultation 583 (1971):1-51.

28. International Review of the Red Cross, September 1976.

29. Elaine Sciolino, "U.N. Adopts Resolution on Terror," 10 December 1985. New York Times p. A4.

30. Robert Gorelick, "Wars of National Liberation: Jus Ad Bellum," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 11 (1979):71-93; William O'Brien, "The Jus in Bello in Revolutionary War and Counterinsurgency," Virginia Journal of International Law 18 (1978):193-242.

31. G.E.M. Anscombe, "War and Murder," in Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience, ed. Walter Stein (London, 1963).

32. O'Brien, op. cit.

33. Farer, op. cit.

34. Francis Boyle, "Statement on Behalf of the United States of America," in On Trial: Reagan's War Against Nicaragua, ed. Marlene Dixon, 161-63 (San Francisco: Synthesis, 1985).

35. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 98.