M.A.R. Habib
Plato's thought represents an integral dimension of Modern Europe's
classical heritage. His complex and changing notions of identity and difference,
his views of the connection between body and soul, passion and reason,
and his own varying assessment of the theory of Forms, as refracted through
Aristotle's critique of all these concepts, have laid the groundwork of
Western logic, metaphysics and political theory until modern times. Yet,
in assessing precisely what modern European thought owes to its classical
heritage, we need to confront the stubborn fact that Plato and Aristotle
stood opposed to both the major philosophical and political tendencies
of modern liberalism (empiricism, materialism, pragmatism, utilitarianism
and the various forms of individualism) and the more recent theoretical
attempts (such as deconstruction, Marxism and Feminism) to undermine those
liberal dogmas. The positions of Plato and Aristotle on nearly of these
issues are concentrated in their respective critiques of democracy.
This paper is motivated by the pivotal question: what can we learn from
the detailed impugnment of democracy offered in Plato's Republic
and Aristotle's Politics? Both texts anticipate several problems
which modern democracies have actually encountered: relativism, excessive
individual licence, disorder in both family life and the state, and inordinate
indulgence in appetite and sensation. In examining these critiques, I will
consider the metaphysical notions on which they rest: unity, the relation
between part and whole, the connection between individual and state, the
concept of purpose and the nature of reason. What governs the connections
between all of these concepts is the status accorded by Plato and Aristotle
to the notions of unity and plurality. Hence, the final section of the
paper will consider to what extent the idea of democracy rests on specific
notions of identity and difference.
In the Republic Plato suggests that there five basic forms of government. His own ideal constitution can be conceived as either royalty or aristocracy (IV, 445D), where sovereignty lies with the carefully trained guardians. The other four forms represent a progressive degeneration away from this model: timocracy (where the pursuit of honour is paramount), oligarchy, democracy and tyranny (such an evolution, it might be added, has no basis in Greek history). Plato also describes five basic kinds of individual characters or souls, corresponding to the respective forms of government (VIII, 544E-545C).
Even the ideal city, acknowledges Plato, will ultimately crumble. Its
deterioration will be caused initially by flaws in the selective breeding
of guardians, generating intermixture and dissension in the ruling class
itself (VIII, 545D-547A). The timocracy eventually produced will retain
some features of the aristocracy such as honouring of rulers and the abstention
of the warrior class from money-making; but in admitting to office men
of high spirit rather than reason it will hold itself perpetually in a
posture of war. Moreover, "a fierce secret lust for gold and silver" and
private gain will infect its rulers. Such will be a state guided by the
coveting of honour (VIII, 547D-548C). This system naturally gives way to
oligarchy where government office is attached to a property qualification
(VIII, 550C) and where the city is no longer a unity but divided effectively
into two cities, between the rich the poor (VIII, 551D). Owing to this
inequitable condition, such a city will be marked by crime and the pervasive
presence of beggars (VIII, 552D). What is perhaps most interesting here
is the way Plato characterises the "soul" of the oligarchic man. Though
he prizes wealth and property above everything, he is "thrifty and laborious,
satisfying only his own necessary appetites and desires...but subduing
his other appetites as vain and unprofitable..." He is, in Socrates' words,
"a squalid fellow,...looking for a surplus of profit in everything..."
(VIII, 554A-B). These words anticipate, almost verbatim, Weber's description
of the mentality of early capitalists. Ironically, while Plato's "ideal"
account of the evolution from monarchy and aristocracy to democracy and
tyranny has little basis in the actual history of Greek society, it might
be read as a valuable idealisation of the historical transitions in Europe
from petty kingdoms through the vast edifice of feudalism to the hegemony
of capitalism, each of these emerging, as Marx would have it, from internal
discord within the previous system. In virtue of the "internal dissension"
of the oligarchic man, whose control over his ebbing appetites is motivated
by fear for his possessions, Plato characterises him as not a unity but
a "double man" (VIII, 554D-E). Again, this might be paralleled with the
ironic self-division of human beings in modern bourgeois society, as theorised
by commentators from diverse traditions, including some of the Romantics,
Hegel, Lukacs, de Tocqueville, and Sartre.
Democracy comes about as a popular revolution against the rich oligarchs;
in the new constitution the people are granted an equal share in citizenship
and political office (VIII, 556E-557B). What is worshipped here is individual
liberty, leading to a number of undesirable consequences. Firstly, "every
man has license to do as he likes" and "would arrange a plan for leading
his own life in the way that pleases him." Secondly, this constitution
would generate all "sorts and conditions of men," a greater variety than
any other form of government. A democracy is thus "diversified with every
type of character" and, shopping through the "bazaar of [individual] constitutions,"
each person could "establish his own." Thirdly, the government would be
"anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to
equals and unequals alike" (VIII, 557B-558C). Moreover, the disorder of
a democratic society extends into private life: the relation of authority
is undermined between parents and children, teachers and pupils, freemen
and slaves, men and women. The spirit of liberty waxes so strong that eventually
even the laws are disregarded and a condition of lawlessness prevails (VIII,
562E-563E).
And what kind of citizen, what kind of soul, would such a democracy
foster? To begin with, the distinction between "necessary" and "unnecessary"
appetites which constrained the desires of the oligarchic man is now abrogated.
The "brood of desires" now "seize the citadel of the young man's soul,
finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits..." (VIII,
560B-561A). The democratic man fosters all parts of the soul equally and
"avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed." His life will
be run by "indulging the appetite of the day", and "he says and does whatever
enters his head." In other words, "there is no order or compulsion in his
existence" (VIII, 561D). Most tellingly, Plato affirms that the democratic
man "is a manifold man stuffed with most excellent differences,...containing
within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities"
(VIII, 561E).
Hence democracy fosters genuine individuals, who resist the reduction
of their social function, or indeed their natural potential, into one exclusive
dimension. Also, democracy nurtures all parts of the soul equally, refusing
obeisance to the law of reason. Above all,the "greed" for liberty is the
hallmark of a democratic society. Such a constitution is the archetype
of social disorder, individuality, emphasis rather than suppression of
difference, and insubordination to reason. Its nature is rooted in self-will
and physical pleasure, in a refusal to acknowledge the hierarchy either
within the soul or that between the soul and body.
From the disorder of the democratic state, maintains Plato, tyranny
will arise, with one man claiming to represent the interests of both social
order and the downtrodden majority. In terms of the evolution of one system
of government from another, Plato's point is that tyranny, though ostensibly
initiated as a reaction against the chaos of democracy, is in fact an extension
of it. Tyranny embodies the utmost depths of anarchy and lawlessness. Hence
the degeneration from aristocracy through oligarchy to democracy and tyranny
represents not only the collapse of the original unity of the state but,
equally importantly, of the unity of the individual into a lawless multiplicity.
The unified, integrated person of the aristocracy who enjoyed a harmony
between the various "classes" of his soul is fragmented first into the
"double" man of oligarchy and then the "manifold" man produced by democracy;
finally, even the vestiges of the soul's structure collapse, in tyranny,
into an uncontrollable proliferation of desires, an abyss of irreducible
particularity, multiplicity and relativity.
It seems clear that the most fundamental metaphysical premise behind
Plato's indictment of democracy is the notion of unity.(1)
According to Plato, unity is the desired end of both individual and state
constitution. He has repeatedly asserted that the democratic "mob," be
it the mob of appetites in the soul or the mob of citizens, must be controlled
by a rational element (IV, 431A-D). Moreover, it is the goal of unity which
dictates a strict division of labour, based on Plato's view that individuals
exercising a variety of functions would lead to the state's ruin (IV, 434B).
Plato actually makes explicit his assumption that unity is intrinsically
a positive value while multiplicity is associated with disorder, indulgence
and evil. He states, for example, that excellence is "one" while the varieties
of evil are infinite (IV, 445C). The greatest evil for a state is that
it should be "many" instead of "one".
In like manner, Plato sees reason itself as a unity while emotion is
variable (X, 604E-605C). The structure of knowledge as Plato conceives
it comprises a movement toward the apprehension of data as an interconnected
whole or system: the science of dialectic both uncovers the first principles
and essences of things and sees them as part of an ordered structure (VII,
533C-D, 534B, 537C). What enables this perception of order is that each
of the Forms is itself a unity which has distilled into itself, as it were,
the concentrated essence of various manifestations in the material world
(V, 476A-B). It underlies, categorises and explains these. But the unity
of the Forms is apprehended only by philosophers; the multitude, says Plato,
are dreamers who "wander amid multiplicities," mistaking resemblance for
identity and particular for universal (V, 476C; VI, 484B). Hence the guardians,
after their initial study of music and gymnastics, must undertake the study
of unity "as such" (VII, 524E), fostered by training in number or arithmetic,
geometry, and astronomy. These sciences depend, according to Plato, on
the use of reason rather than the senses. The most fundamental strategy
toward the political implementation of unity is to unite the functions
of ruler and philosopher. Plato sees the current separation of these roles
as itself an expression of multiplicity; at present, a "motley horde" pursues
either task independently (V, 473D).
Plato here unwittingly reveals that, if the movement towards knowledge
and justice is essentially a movement toward unity whether in individual
or state, it is also a movement of coercion. The ruling faculty in the
soul and the ruling body in the state do not unify any real differences:
the unity Plato has in mind is achieved by suppressing all difference and
imperiously positing itself as the constant inner structure of a given
type of variety in the physical world. For example, there is no compromise
either between the multitude of competing appetites and desires in the
soul or between these and reason: they must fall under the absolute sovereignty
of reason. Similarly, the unity of the state is not achieved by any true
harmony of the conflicting claims of various classes or groups; the guardians,
the privileged political embodiment of reason, determine absolutely the
interests of the state. Hence "unity" is anything but a confluence or coexistence
of equal parts. Rather, it is effectively a euphemism for a system of dominance,
a rigid hierarchy whereby the "lower" (referrable to the body, the appetites
or the majority of people in a state) is not merely subsumed under the
"higher" but is divested by such subsumption of any independent claim to
reality, meaning or value.
Plato's overarching disposition towards unity asserts itself most pervasively
and at every level, from the point of origin of a city to its formally
articulated bureaucratic structure. What needs to be observed here is how
unity -- even more than the alleged goals of justice or the Good -- is
the ultimate teleological principle informing the interrelation of elements
comprising the city's overall constitution.
According to Plato, the originating circumstance of a city is that individuals
are not self-sufficient. No person can adequately provide the total of
his or her own needs (II, 369B). The deeper premise beneath this is a strict
-specialisation of function whereby "One man is naturally fitted for one
task" (II, 370B). Plato is adamant on this point, insisting that "it is
impossible for one man to do the work of many arts well" and that in the
ideal city every man would work at "one occupation...all his days" (II,
374A-C). This rigid division of labour is the foundation of the entire
analogy between the just individual and the just city. The text's overall
purpose is to arrive at a definition of justice, which is reached in Book
IV: justice is a condition where "each one man must perform one social
service in the state for which his nature was best adapted." It is also
defined as the "principle of doing one's own business" and "not to be a
busybody" (IV, 433A-B). Socrates recognises here that this "principle"
for which he had been seeking had in fact already been laid down as "a
universal requirement" in the very origin of a city (as cited above). Justice
"in itself" is a phantom exorcised by its very pursuit in the Republic:
its function is reduced to pure circularity, acting at once as the origin
and end of the state, with no intermediary logic connecting these extremes
of its ostensibly structuring polarity. The circularity of argument is
even more pronounced in Plato's remoulding of his analogy between the state
and the individual. Predictably, justice in an individual is defined as
a condition of the soul where "the several parts...perform each their own
task", and where reason rules. Such an harmonious soul will be fostered
by a correct blending of gymnastics and music (IV, 441E-442A).
Where the circularity of the concept of unity encompasses for Plato
the origin and purpose of a state, Aristotle's procedure in the Politics
is strikingly different. To evince the overall contrast of both method
and content between the two thinkers, it may be useful to consider firstly
Aristotle's metaphysical presuppositions, secondly his observations on
the state in general, and finally his assessment of democracy as informed
by these.
To begin with, Aristotle's self-proclaimed analytic and somewhat empirical
method (I, i) is far less prone to the strategy of hypostatization which
governs much of Plato's thinking in the
Republic. Aristotle's method
is to begin with the notion of a composite whole which is broken down into
its smallest parts. Hence, where Plato sees democracy and the other forms
of government as having a fairly determinate essence or set of defining
characteristics, Aristotle is adamant that there are different types of
democracy, oligarchy and aristocracy. In fact, his delineation of what
he considers the best constitution, which he calls "polity," is dependent
on precisely this definitional malleability of each constitution and its
ability to be mixed with other constitutional forms. More importantly,
this analytic mentality underlies Aristotle's rejection of Plato's view
that the state should comprise a unity. Aristotle holds that a state is
a composite whole made up of parts; he also defines the state as an aggregate
of citizens large enough to secure a self-sufficient life; a further definition
suggests that the state is an association of citizens in a constitution
(III, i-iii). Aristotle's entire text stresses the plurality of parts in
any state and the need to reconcile these (IV, iii). Given these assumptions,
Aristotle maintains, as against Plato, that the state cannot be a unity;
unity, in fact, would destroy the state's self-sufficiency given that the
state harbours not only a plurality of numbers but different kinds of men
existing in relations of reciprocal equivalence and mutually supporting
diversity of function. The state's plurality, and lack of natural unity,
is further evident in the rotation of office whereby citizens take turns
to rule and be ruled; Aristotle goes so far as to say that such rotation
entails the same citizens becoming different persons at different times
(II, ii), a view which contrasts sharply with Plato's advocacy of a strict
specialisation of function. Aristotle does not, of course, suggest that
a state exists in a condition of unconstrained plurality; whatever unity
a state achieves is given in its harmonisation of various interests and
is also a function of education in the "spirit" of a given constitution,
an education which entails training of both habits and the intellect (II,
v).
A second presupposition deriving from Aristotle's metaphysics concerns the teleology of the state. The state's purpose, for Aristotle, is arguably the chief element in its definition. Perhaps unfairly, Aristotle criticises Plato for reducing the state to the satisfaction of minimum needs, with no finer purpose beyond utility and necessity (IV, iv). Aristotle's onw view is that the state does not simply exist for the utilitarian functions of providing a living, protection and the exchange of goods (III, ix). The state is a political association which aims at the "highest good" (I, i). According to Aristotle, the chief end of men, both communally and individually, is the "good life" (III, vi). In defining the good life, Aristotle has recourse to his own earlier formulations in the Ethics: "the life which is best for men, both separately, as individuals, and in the mass, as states, is the life which has virtue sufficiently supported by material resources to facilitate participation in the actions that virtue calls for" (VII, i). And, again repeating statements in his Ethics, happiness is proportionate to the achievement of virtue and phronesis or practical wisdom (VII, i). Hence the ultimate end of a state is primarily the achievment of virtue; it exists, says Aristotle, for the sake of "noble actions" (III, ix).
However, since for Aristotle, virtue and happiness are internally and
not contingently related, he later qualifies the aim of a state: "we call
that state best ordered in which the possibilities of happiness are greatest"
(VII, xiii).
The third metaphysical premise, also repeated from the Ethics,
is the principle that virtue is a mean between excess and defect (IV, xi).
Aristotle, calling this the "principle of the middle way," extends its
applicability to the formation of constitutions (V, ix). Hence, in a political
context, Aristotle defines the best life as "the middle life," which habours
a mean open to men of every kind (IV, xi). This principle will become important
in both Aristotle's assessment of democracy and his formulation of what
he considers to be the most descirable constitution, which he calls "polity."
These three metaphysical premises, which concern the connection between
whole and part, unity and plurality, teleology and the principle of the
middle way, underlie three characteristics which Aristotle ascribes as
necessary in any state. Of all kinds of knowledge and skill, says Aristotle,
the most soveriegn is statecraft. And the good aimed at in the state is
justice. Secondly, the justice aimed at is defined as what benefits the
whole community (III, xii). Thirdly, as a totality, as a whole, the state
has a natural priority over the individual, who is merely a part (I, ii).
This is qualified, however, by Aristotle's view that the "same things are
best for a community and for individuals" (VII, xiv). Finally, we might
add that Aristotle regarded the most fundamental division of any state
as that between rich and poor, which he regards as invariably occupying
a relation of opposition.
Aristotle's comments on democracy need to be understood against the
foregoing background and also to be considered in the context of his general
description of "correct" and "deviated" constitutions. A correct constitution,
he maintains, must enable rule for the common good in accordance with "absolute"
justice, not for private advantage. He lists three correct constitutions:
monarchy, aristocracy (the rule of the best in virtue) and polity, which
refers to the rule of the mass of people for the common interest. There
are three respective constitutions which deviate from these: tyranny arises
when the monarch rules for his own benefit; oligarchy results from aristocracy
when the men of means rule for their own advantage; and democracy arises
from polity when the poor rule in their own interests. Of these, tyranny
is the worst, says Aristotle, then oligarchy. Democracy is the least bad
because it is the most moderate (IV, ii).
In contrast with our modern notions of democracy, Aristotle would have
seen demokratia as denoting the rule of the demos or common
people in their own interests. This very principle would collide
with what he saw as one of the essential purposes of any state. Another
point on which Aristotle realistically insists is that the true distinction,
found in fact, between oligarchy and democracy is not that between rule
of the few and rule of the many but between sovereignty of the rich and
sovereignty of the poor (III, viii). Aristotle later defines democracy
as rule by those who are free but not wealthy (IV, iv). With equal realism,
he implicitly rejects Plato's hypostatization of democracy or any other
form of government and argues that there are several kinds of democracy
and oligarchy to be found in practice. The first form of democracy is based
on the principle of equality, where the rich and poor have the same advantages.
The second form stipulates a modest property-qualification for the holding
of office. In the third and fourth forms, which are described rather vaguely,
all of the citizens rule provided they pass scrutiny, but they all uphold
the higher rule of law. In the final and most extreme form of democracy,
it is not the law which is sovereign but the multitude of people: through
the influence of demagogues who curry their favour against the nobles and
rule popular opinion, the people itself becomes a monarch, one person composed
of many. Aristotle, in fact, urges that such a democracy rests on no real
constitution since the law does not hold sway (IV, iv).
It is true that, like Plato, Aristotle sees many actual or potential evils in democracy.The two hallmarks of democracy he cites as the sovereignty of the majority and liberty (V, ix). Like Plato, he is wary of the possibly inordinate extension of liberty to mean living as one likes. Aristotle rejoins that living according to the constitution is not slavery but self-preservation (V, ix). He also reiterates Plato's charges that democracy may be marked by a general disorder and disrespect for the law, lack of control over slaves, women and children. However, it is vital to note that Aristotle's criticisms are directed primarily at what he sees as the most extreme democracy, where all of the citizens share and deliberate (VI, iv). Moreover, the constitution which Aristotle himself advocates, called polity, is offered as a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, a mixture which can lean in either direction (IV, vi).
The principle of the middle way thus introduces itself on a number of
levels in Aristotle's exposition of polity. The aim of this constitutional
mixture, says Aristotle, is to regard the interests of both rich and poor,
the wealthy and the free. The criterion of virtue, paramount in an ideal
aristocracy, is also to be included. Thus polity occupies a "middle" position
in which the extremes of both democracy and oligarchy disappear (IV, viii-ix).
Aristotle observes that all states contain three sections, the very rich,
the very poor and those in the middle. Again invoking the principle of
the mean, he asserts that to hold a "middling" amount of property is best
of all. People in this condition, whom he calls hoi mesoi, are most
easily obedient to reason; they exhibit the least reluctance and least
eagerness to hold office; they are exempt from from the arrogance of the
very rich, who cannot understand how to be ruled; and from the wickedness
of the poor, who cannot understand how to rule (IV, xi).
Aristotle positively encourages enlarging this middle section of the
citizenry since it is the most secure and acts to prevent excesses from
the other two classes. It is, according to Aristotle, free of faction,
and when it is large enough to outweigh any combination of the other two
extremes the constitution has a good chance of being permanent. In general,
the better mixed a constitution, the longer it will last. This middle section
of people has given rise to the best lawgivers, such as Solon and Lycurgus,
and any current legislators, whether in an oligarchy or a democracy, should
include consideration of this class (IV, xi-xii).
While the practicability of Aristotle's introduction of an ethical principle
into economic affairs might be questioned, it is clear that the polity
he has in mind is aristocratic, but with more leaning toward democracy
than oligarchy. In fact, it comes close to Aristotle's description of a
"thoroughgoing democracy" where rich and poor together exercise power on
the basis of an equality both arithmetical (regarding numbers) and proportionate
(regarding wealth) (VI, ii). Aristotle urges the discouragement of either
exceptional prosperity of any section of the population or extreme indigence.
Overall, it may be that in his insistence on the supra-utilitarian functions
of the state, the question of its purpose, and adherence to the principle
of the mean, Aristotle is closer to our modern notions of democracy than
is conventionally thought. Unlike Plato, he provides insight into various
forms and possibilities of democracy; it may be, that in the light of the
collapse of the communist bloc, we need to broaden our own conceptions
of the range of possibilities offered by democracy. Perhaps democracy can
be extricated from the immediate history of its own subservience to liberal
bourgeois notions and interests. It might be broadened, for example, to
include genuinely Marxist conceptions of a socialist state where individual
liberty becomes a reality for all and not just for the ruling class. It
is ironic in this respect that Aristotle, so often viewed as the source
of catious empiricism and conservative political gradualism, should stress
that the main polarity in a state is not ideological but economic, that
between rich and poor.
Aristotle's insistence that the state serve the common interest and
that it has an ethical purpose transcending utilitarian needs might also
prompt us to revisit our motives for desiring a genuine democracy. The
contrast between the polities of Plato and Aristotle might be the starting
point, not for simplistically dismissing the notion of unity (as so much
contemporary theory has done), but for acknowledging its complexity and
examining its history. Is it possible to define unity otherwise than as
a suppression or rejection of difference? Hegel's Logic certainly
insists on this; but what might be the political implications of seeing
unity and diversity, identity and difference, as mutually constutitive?
How can we define unity or identity in a "multicultural" context, whether
we speak of alternative canons or of a truly comprehensive state?
References
1. For a further but somewhat brief discussion of unity in the Republic, see Nicholas P. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis, 1979), pp. 38-40.