from The Economist, December 31, 1999.
Talking to the world
NO REVOLUTIONS in technology
have as visibly marked the human condition as those in
transport. Moving
goods and people, they have opened continents, transformed living standards,
spread diseases, fashions
and folk around the world. Yet technologies to transport ideas and
information across
long distances have arguably achieved even more: they have spread
knowledge, the basis
of economic growth.
The most basic of all these, the written word, was already ancient by 1000.
By then China had, in
basic form, the printing
press, using carved woodblocks. But the key to its future, movable metal
type, was four centuries
away. The Chinese were hampered by their thousands of ideograms.
Even so, they quite
soon invented primitive movable type, made of clay, and by the 13th century
they had movable wooden
type. But the real secret was the use of an easily cast metal.
When it came, Europe—aided by simple western alphabets—leapt forward with
it. One reason
why Asia’s civilisations,
in 1000 far ahead of Europe’s, then fell behind was that they lacked the
technology to reproduce
and diffuse ideas. On Johannes Gutenberg’s invention in the 1440s were
built not just the
Reformation and the Enlightenment, but Europe’s agricultural and industrial
revolutions too.
Yet information technology on its own would not have got far. Literally:
better transport
technology too was
needed. That was not lacking, but here the big change came much later:
it was
railways and steamships
that first allowed the speedy, widespread dissemination of news and
ideas over long distances.
And both technologies in turn required people and organisations to
develop their use.
They got them: for individual communication, the postal service; for wider
publics, the publishing
industry.
Throughout the 19th century, the postal service formed the bedrock of national
and international
communications. Crucial
to its growth had been the introduction of the gummed postage stamp,
combined with a low
price, and payment by the sender (not, as till then, the recipient). Britain
put
all three of these
ideas into effect in 1840 (50 years later, alas, than its first plan for
a penny post).
By then, the world’s mail was taking off. It changed the world. Merchants
in America’s eastern
cities used it to
gather information, enraging far-off cotton growers and farmers, who found
that
New Yorkers knew more
about crop prices than they did. In the American debate about slavery,
it
offered abolitionists
a low-cost way to spread their views, just as later technologies have cut
the
cost and widened the
scope of political lobbying. The post helped too to integrate the American
nation, tying the
newly opened west to the settled east.
Everywhere, its development drove and was driven by those of transport.
In Britain, travellers
rode by mail coach
to posting inns. In America, the post subsidised road-building. Indeed,
argues
Dan Schiller, a professor
of communications at the University of California, it was the connection
between the post,
transport and national integration that ensured that the mail remained
a public
enterprise even in
the United States, its first and only government-run communications medium,
and until at least
the 1870s, the biggest organisation in the land. And in most countries—the
United
States was an exception—the
carriers of mail became in turn the providers of telegraphy and then
of telephony.
Spreading the news
The change has not
only been one of speed and distance, though, but of audience. At the start
of
the millennium, with
rare exceptions—kings, chiefs and churchmen—a man’s words could reach
no further than his
voice, not just in range but in whom they reached. Gossip moves fast, be
it
from medieval mouth
to ear or mobile phone to phone. But, for some purposes, efficient
communication is mass
communication, regular, cheap, quick and reliable. When it became
possible it transformed
the world. Now one voice could reach distant thousands.
Of all the mass media, from ancient official or personal inscriptions on
stone to today’s satellite
broadcasts, those
printed on paper have had the most profound influence. The book, pamphlet
and newspaper have
spread knowledge (and nonsense), transforming economies, politics and
religion.
Before Gutenberg, books—even the reading of them, let alone the ownership—were
largely the
preserve of monks
and the rich. Churchmen had their works of devotion; a few bibliophiles,
thinkers and students
were keen to read classical authors. But all had to be copied by scribes,
not
machines. Then came
Gutenberg’s device and within 50 years Europe was peppered with around
9m books, and presses
turned in 60 German towns alone. In 1498, 18,000 letters of indulgence
were printed in a
single city, Barcelona. By 1539 Europeans were printing books in the New
World too.
From then on, supply and demand boomed. There had to be an audience able
to read, of course;
but the spread of
education saw to that. Europe’s rising middle classes, increasingly literate,
demanded Bibles that
they could read themselves in a language they understood, as well as details
of new philosophic,
geographic and scientific discoveries. Printing spread plays and poetry.
None of this advance just happened. It required printers and in time a
new industry, publishers.
For centuries after
Gutenberg, there was little change in the way books were made. Leather
covers
were used, and thick
paper. All aspects of the trade were dominated by the printer. He was the
publisher and retail
bookseller as well.
He was also soon recognised as a potentially subversive force. From the
early days of printing the
church had tried to
censor books, drawing up an index of forbidden ones. The Inquisition kept
authors and printers
in line. Philosophers, to prevent their works (or themselves) being burnt,
were
obliged to dedicate
them to the proper authorities, even if the rationalist content was actually
subversive. Monarchs
were not far behind the church in their suspicion, requiring books to be
licensed. And they
persisted in this practice far longer than the church could. Writers in
19th-century Russia
repeatedly hit trouble with the censors; their 20th-century successors
were to
hit it worse.
The censors were too late. Already the 18th century, and then, above all,
the industrial revolution,
had changed the world
of books. Demand for books and learning—and distraction—exploded.
With improved transport
and better technology, the 19th century took books to the masses,
novels to young ladies
and texts to the new universities. Writers, printers and distributors were
no
longer bound together.
“Literature for the millions,” promised Archibald Constable, a gifted
bookseller and an
owner of the Encyclopaedia Britannica at the start of that century. By
the end of
it, 6,000 new titles
were being published annually in Britain alone.
As with books, the spread of newspapers had a profound effect on European
society. The first
ones, in the late
Middle Ages, specialised in commercial news, mainly from abroad. But by
the
time of the English
civil war in the mid-17th century, there were some 300 newspapers reporting
the battles from one
side or the other. A sign of newspapers’ importance from an early date
is the
effort governments
made to restrict their sale, through taxes or simple repression. Britain’s
18th-century Stamp
Act was known as a “tax on knowledge”. The first country to guarantee press
freedom was Sweden,
in 1766.
With the industrial revolution newspapers were transformed from campaigning
pamphlets or
carriers of specialist
knowledge to big business. New technology brought down costs:
hand-driven presses
gave way to steam-driven ones, and then electric ones. By the late 19th
century newspapers
could be produced by the hundred thousand in a few hours. Their nature
also
changed, and their
price. The tabloid press was born, its taste for scandal, exposure of
wrong-doing, hard-hitting
editorials and smooth fabrication no less then than now: the Hearst
press worked hard
to start the United States’ 1898 war with Spain; the London Daily Mirror
savaged the lack of
lifeboats on the sunken Titanic.
The electric message
What we now call “hard
copy” has continued essentially unchanged since Gutenberg. Letters are
still written, books
bound, newspapers—mostly—printed and distributed much as they ever were.
But meanwhile, communication,
individual and collective, has been revolutionised by electricity.
The first telegraph was mechanical: a tower with movable arms whose positions
could be read
from afar with a telescope.
In 1794, a line of these carried news of a battle within an hour of its
end 210km from Lille
to Paris. Over the next 40 years, such lines fanned out across Europe*.
Then, in 1816, one Francis Ronalds, who had built a primitive electric
telegraph in his west
London garden, suggested
the idea to the British navy. Any kind of telegraph, he was told, was
“wholly unnecessary”.
Not till 1839 did two British inventors, William Cooke and Charles
Wheatstone, open a
commercial electric telegraph along a 21km stretch of railway from London.
Samuel Morse, an American,
had also been working on telegraphy, and by 1838 had perfected his
code. A wired world
was on its infant feet.
“The telegraph should be an instrument of politics, not of commerce,” snorted
France’s minister
of the interior in
1847. In vain: it transformed commerce. Indeed in the United States, thanks
to the
high charges of private
companies, its use was almost entirely commercial. Railways used it to
run
their single-track
lines safely; salesmen to transmit orders; market-men of every kind to
learn
prices, buy and sell;
isolated farmers to send for spare parts; shipowners, once undersea cables
had been laid—the
first transatlantic one in 1858—to tell their captains where cargo was
to be
found.
Next the telephone, initially greeted almost as sceptically as the telegraph.
“Too many
shortcomings to be
seriously considered as a means of communication. Inherently of no value
to
us,” said Western
Union in an internal memo, after being offered Alexander Graham Bell’s
patent
for $100,000. By 1910
the world had 7m telephones; by 1950, about 51m; by 1990, 520m; and
today around 1 billion—plus
almost 500m mobile phones, not 20 years after they came into use
(and AT&T misjudged
their commercial future, much as Western Union had erred a century
before). These too
have brought a new dimension to communication: suddenly, mankind can talk
to the world from
car, street, field or swimming-pool. More than that, mobiles have brought
the
telephone to millions
in poor countries, where land lines were and often still are hard to come
by.
Yet it had not been immediately clear what the telephone’s best use would
be. A service was set
up in Budapest in
1893 to provide what one might call on-line news and entertainment,
interspersed with
advertising. In the evening it offered a children’s programme and lessons
in
English and French;
on Sunday a grand concert. At its peak, in the 1920s and 1930s, the service
had more than 10,000
subscribers, and it died only in 1944.
The broadcasters
That, briefly, was
the first mass-communication by electrical means, a role soon to be
monopolised by wireless.
But the first use of wireless was for “telegraphy” at sea (the Titanic’s
set was used mainly
for passengers to keep in touch with land). And transatlantic telephone
calls
went by radio until
the first submarine telephone cable to carry them was laid in 1956. In
the early
years of this century,
AT&T saw radio as a potential threat to its landline network. Only
now has
that threat become
real, as voice calls migrate to wireless (while television broadcasts,
paradoxically, increasingly
go by cable). By the 1920s, when radio shares were booming as madly
as Internet shares
were doing recently, AT&T had changed its mind and tried to become
a big fish
in broadcasting (only
to bow out rapidly, to dodge antitrust lawsuits).
The radio wave was soon to find its true vocation: as a mass medium, to
rival the centuries-old
newspaper press, and,
with added entertainment, to outstrip it. This was especially true in the
United States. Other
countries, with their state-owned telegraph and telephone services, moved
naturally on to state
broadcasting. America allowed a ferment of competition to grow into a
handful of (regulated)
private networks. At first their broadcasts were subsidised from sales
of
radios, to get customers
to buy the set. Then they invented the radio commercial.
With it, communications were changing commerce yet again. National brands,
which national
magazines had begun
to build, flourished on the back of national broadcast entertainment. As
commercial radio and
then television arose, so did whole new industries: advertising agencies,
programme makers,
public-relations consultants, stars. Hollywood’s bread and butter has long
come from television;
films are the jam.
The step up from radio to television may seem an essentially technical
one, however brilliant as
such. Not so. A picture
really is, in some respects, worth a thousand words, as magazines like
Life had long since
proved; and now the newsreel, once reserved to cinema-goers, was available
in any home in any
rich country at the turn of a switch. Television could shape politics,
and did,
witness American reaction
to the Vietnam war. And, increasingly, “the news” is what happens on
camera. Off camera,
it just didn’t happen.
Or if editors choose not to show it. Happily, though, satellite and cable
broadcasting are changing
that balance: no longer
need viewers, even in some closed societies, rely on a monopoly, state-run
broadcaster.
Technology has also now brought the most potent tool of communication ever
available to the
individual. Using
e-mail or website, he or she can now publish, to one recipient, to hundreds,
to
tens of thousands.
The noise about the web is all about its use for selling and buying. Huge
changes it will bring.
But the best change may be a new empowerment of the individual; a return
to
pre-Gutenberg days,
when one man’s voice could reach as far as almost any other.