An Inside Story of Racial Bias and Denial, New Jersey Files Reveal Drama Behind Profiling

   By DAVID KOCIENIEWSKI and ROBERT HANLEY

    The 91,000 pages of state     documents released last week   about racial profiling by the New   Jersey State Police offer a rare   look at one of the most contentious   battlefields in the nation's war on   drugs.

  Taken as a whole, the reams of   memos, internal investigations,   complaint letters and confidential   reports show how the institutions   of state government denied   accusations of selective   enforcement for nearly a decade   before grudgingly admitting it and   making changes.

  But the words written by the   thousands of people involved --   troopers, civilians, attorneys   general and state officials -- also   tell an intensely emotional story:   one of gung-ho troopers who saw   themselves as unappreciated as   they risked their lives to protect   New Jersey's minority members   from drug violence, and who   sought promotions based on   high-visibility drug arrests; the   anger and defensiveness of police   commanders who believed their   tactics were unjustly branded as   racist; the outrage of minority   troopers ordered to view their own   neighbors as drug suspects; the   bewilderment of black and   Hispanic drivers who could not   understand why they were detained   by the police simply because of the   color of their skin.

  The story begins in the mid-1980's, when the federal   Drug Enforcement Administration responded to the   street violence of the crack epidemic by enlisting local   police forces to catch smugglers who were importing   drugs from Latin America, often to Florida, and moving   them to major American cities by car.

  By 1989, the New Jersey State Police had become such  a successful part of "Operation Pipeline" that D.E.A.   officials hailed the troopers as exemplary models for   most other states.

  But on New Jersey roadways, black and Hispanic   drivers were subjected to such frequent, unjustified   traffic stops and searches that they complained of a   new, unwritten violation in the state's traffic code:   "driving while black." In state police barracks, some   black and Hispanic troopers bitterly acknowledged that   even though the state officially prohibited racial   profiling, senior troopers trained them to single out   drivers on the basis of their ethnicity or race.

  The documents show that a few state law enforcement   officials were troubled by evidence that minority   drivers were being stopped and searched   disproportionately.

  Those concerns grew in 1996, when a state judge in   Gloucester County ruled that troopers had engaged in   "de facto racial profiling." But high-level officials of   the state police and the attorney general's office   defended their drug- interdiction strategy, even as they   concealed their own statistical analyses showing that   minority drivers were being singled out. Privately, state   police officials argued that it was only fitting that black   and Hispanic drivers should face more scrutiny than   whites because New Jersey's drug trade problem was   primarily a minority issue.

  On April 22, 1998, troopers shot and wounded three   unarmed black and Hispanic men during a traffic stop   on the turnpike, propelling the controversy to the center   of the state's political stage. State officials, including   Gov. Christie Whitman, at first clung to their insistence   that there was no pattern of profiling. But under   unrelenting pressure from civil rights leaders and the   federal Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, the   Whitman administration ultimately acknowledged   racial profiling, revamped its narcotics strategy and   agreed to let a federal judge monitor the force.

  These are some of the documents released last week:

  Soon after the administration of former Gov. Thomas   H. Kean ordered the war on drugs on the turnpike,   lawyers in the state's Division of Criminal Justice   studied federal and state court rulings on the legality of   the so-called "drug courier profile." In a memo to   superiors on July 25, 1988, a deputy attorney general,   Meredith A. Cote, wrote that the clear principle that
  "emerges from pertinent case law is that the stop and/or   seizure of an individual by law enforcement officers   solely on the basis of drug-courier profile factors is   unconstitutional. An officer must possess articulable,   particularized facts, in addition to the profile   characteristics, in order to justify such action."

  But the memorandum did not rule out use of the profile.

  "The fact that a drug courier profile may not be used as   a tool for selective prosecution does not, however,   entirely preclude its use after a police officer has   effectuated a valid stop for a legitimate motor vehicle   violation. As indicated previously, profile   characteristics may be used by law enforcement   officers in conjunction with other articulable,   particularized facts to justify subsequent" searches.

  Some training documents for state troopers used in the   late 1980's and early 1990's had a racial focus. One,   titled "Occupant Identifiers for a Possible Drug   Courier," began by identifying these drivers and   passengers as suspicious: Colombian men, Hispanic   men, Hispanic men and black men together, and   Hispanic men and women posing as couples. "Any   combination of sexes or races could be possible drug   couriers," the document said. "Only a few of the   common ones were listed above."

  The state police training bureau offered a course in the   early 1990's called Sociology for the Police Officer.   One of the topics was "ethnic and racial minorities."   An outline had these sub-headings:

  IV.Police Stereotypical View of Minorities
  A. Wary of minority people.
  B. Believe minorities are more likely to be involved in   criminal activities
  1. Chinese Americans more likely to be involved in   crimes of gambling.
  2. Italian Americans more likely to be involved in   organized crime.
  3. Black Americans are more likely to be involved of   crimes of violence.
  4. Spanish-speaking Americans are more likely to be  involved in fights or taunting officers.
  C. Greater degree of hostility directed toward police.
  V. Minority stereotypical views of police
  A. Are much more critical of police action.
  B. More willing to see racial slights in police actions.
  C. Feel more subject to mistreatment, harassment and   brutality.
  D. Police are symbolic, stand for the power and   authority of the majority, visible signs of majority   dominated.
  E. Police perceived in the punishment business.
  F. Police are a `blue minority.'
  VI. Ethnic and Racial Cultures
  C. Differing Cultures, attitudes and values.
  1. Black Americans
  a. Blacks value their families.
  b. Blacks value religion.
  c. Blacks value material goods as well.
  1. Blacks who are not able to purchase their own home   put money into cars.
  a. Cars important -- show individual's style and   personality, just as home would.

  In September 1989, the state police intelligence bureau   prepared a document, apparently in response to a series   on WWOR-TV that said troopers were stopping   motorists on the turnpike on the basis of race, that   talked about "Jamaican Posses" in New York City and   Philadelphia using the turnpike as a conduit to transport   drugs. It also said that 76.3 percent of all drug and   weapons arrests on the turnpike in 1988 involved   blacks. But the document said that troopers were not   taught to practice racial profiling and were not doing it.   It said instruction for troopers "does not include   profiling or targeting techniques, but rather behavior-   symptom analysis, conversational techniques, case law,   and search and seizure procedure. Thus, the training   focuses on events after the motor vehicle stop."

  On the high percentage of blacks arrested on the   turnpike in 1988, the report added: "The fact that more   blacks are arrested than whites is not a result of racial   targeting but is due to: 1) nearly two-thirds of all I-95/   Turnpike corridor arrests are for drugs and weapon   offenses, an area which intelligence suggests is heavily   comprised of American blacks, Jamaican gangs,   Colombian cartels, Cuban exiles and Dominican   criminals."

  The report said that "intelligence" indicated that "black   and Hispanic narcotics and weapon offenders" were   traveling from city to city in and around New Jersey. It   added: "Therefore, New Jersey's road troopers should   necessarily be encountering and arresting a significant   number of black and Hispanic criminals who utilize   specific roadways in the furtherance of their criminal,   particularly narcotics-related, endeavors."

  In August 1993, Alexander P. Waugh, the executive   assistant attorney general at the time, apparently began   having misgivings about racial profiling. In a memo to   Fred DeVesa, the acting attorney general at the time,   Mr. Waugh, now a state Superior Court judge, said the   profiling issue had come up in a recent meeting with   state police troop commanders.

  "It occurs to me that it might be useful to have some   further thought given to the issue of profiling, perhaps   even leading up to the promulgation of some   guidelines," Mr. Waugh wrote. "I believe the SP would   benefit from some further advice in this area."

  Mr. Waugh's suggestion got an icy rejection. A   handwritten note scrawled at the bottom of his memo   said: "Alex -- State Police SOP on road stops is pretty   good. If it ain't broke don't fix it."

  The initials of the person who wrote the rejection were   indecipherable.

  During hearings on the Gloucester County case,   Kenneth Wilson, who had been a trooper from 1987 to   1989, testified that he had been taught about profiling   by his superiors and D.E.A. agents in seminars. In a   document submitted to the court, he wrote: "I was   directed and urged to stop and search persons who fit   the profile if I wanted to make `good arrests.' We were   given wide discretion and told to follow our hunches. If   we wanted to stop and search someone or some   persons, we would stop and search. Any possible   violations such as speeding, or improper equipment,   were afterthoughts. "

  Mr. Wilson added: "As part of my general training, I  was specifically taught how to write operation reports.   We were specifically taught how to justify in our   subsequent reports our stops and searches so that we   would utter the right words, which would stand up in   court. We were taught to write the right reports to   justify our actions in court, whether or not that is what   actually occurred on the roadway."

  Mr. Wilson was suspended from the state police in   1989 after he and two other troopers were indicted on   charges of stealing $500 from three people they had   stopped on the turnpike. He eventually pleaded guilty to   official misconduct and was placed on probation for   five years.

  In the months after the profiling decision, state police   commanders had generated so much evidence of   profiling that even commanders of the Internal Affairs   Bureau suggested that the department begin keeping a   track of the racial breakdown of each trooper's stops,   and including that data on the officers' evaluations. Col.   Carl A. Williams, then the state police superintendent,   vehemently objected, adding his handwritten comments   to an Oct. 4, 1996, memo:

  "No! Station commander/Asst. commander will be   responsible for this. If they see a problem it will be up   to them to take the proper action."

  Soon after the ruling in the profiling case in 1996, the   Justice Department's Civil Rights Division started   investigating the state police. Officials in the state   police and the attorney general's office seemed to chafe   at the inquiry.

  In December 1996, the Civil Rights Division sent the   attorney general's office a request for data on traffic   stops and documents on patrol, management and   training. A month later, in a reply, Peter G. Verniero,   then the attorney general, referred to "our mutual   commitment to the goal of ensuring that the civil rights   of all persons are protected."

  But internal documents suggest Mr. Verniero and his   staff wanted to narrow the number of state police   documents they would send to the Justice Department.

  On a memo dated Jan. 9, 1997, Colonel Williams said   he had spoken with Mr. Verniero and his top aides   about the data sought from the Justice Department. The   notes added, "At this time, same will be restricted to   the Turnpike Stations of Cranbury and Moorestown,"   the barracks involved in the profiling case.

  By early 1997, state police officials had found their  most incriminating data yet: a study that found that more   than 80 percent of the searches carried out by troopers   in two stations involved black motorists. Rather than   surrender the data to the Justice Department, Sgt. T.   Gilbert recommended to Colonel Williams that the   department consider strategies to pre-empt any attempt   by federal government to force New Jersey into a   consent decree for monitoring of the state police. "At   this point we are in a bad spot," the recommendation   said. "Through the Gloucester County case, the Illinois   State Police investigation and the Maryland State   Police Study/Settlement, the Justice Department has a   very good understanding of how we operate and what   kind of numbers they can get their hands on to prove   their position."

  He went on to write, "The preliminary analysis makes   it clear that the more historical search data we give   them, the worse off we will be in regards to having any   control over what we are forced into."

  On May 20, 1997, Mr. Verniero scheduled a meeting   with his chief deputies involved in the Justice   Department's inquiry and with Colonel Williams. An   unsigned, handwritten note on the bottom of a memo   about the meeting suggests that Mr. Verniero strongly   opposed relenting to a consent decree with the federal   government. It says, "AG advised he would not consent   to signing a consent decree, `they'd have to tie me to a   train and drag me along the track before I'd sign a   decree.' "

  Over the years, even after the ruling in the profiling   case, letters from angry black and Hispanic drivers   poured into state offices, including Mrs. Whitman's,
  saying that profiling had not stopped.

  On June 6, 1998, a black Korean War veteran wrote the   governor that he had been traveling on the turnpike for   30 years, and had been "stopped by the state police on   the average of twice a year for really no good reason,   except that I was driving a late model BMW or   Lincoln."

  The man said that during all the stops over three   decades troopers found grounds to give him only one   summons -- for a broken taillight.