Life, Liberty and Excessive Force
By ORLANDO PATTERSON
The police killing of Amadou Diallo and the exoneration of the four
officers who shot him have naturally set off heated debates on
police procedures
and race relations in our cities. But this tragedy has
implications
of a broader and more profound nature: when viewed in light
of ongoing trends
in our criminal justice system, it exposes deep-seated
contradictions
in our conception and practice of personal liberty.
Three of the
most fundamental principles of Western liberal democracies
are at issue.
One
is the right to do what one pleases as long as it entails
no harm to others. Another is equal justice for all. Last is the principle
that no person or other agent, including the state, has the right to tell
a
citizen what is in his or her best interest -- a current of antipaternalism
that has always
run far stronger in the American idea of democracy than
in other liberal
Western countries.
These principles
normally work well together, if none is taken to
extremes, as
the Western European democracies clearly demonstrate.
But developments
in America have placed them on a collision course,
especially in
the sphere of criminal justice.
Of course, our liberties have to be protected from criminals among us.
But there are two complementary ways of going about this: we can take
preventive measures, like the rehabilitation of those who commit crimes,
to reduce the incidence of crime before it happens, and we can punish
those who do commit crimes, giving the police and courts strong powers
of enforcement and incarceration.
America
had a history of using preventive programs prior to the 1970's
-- not only those that stressed the rehabilitation of convicts, but also
others aimed at children and young people, like the home visiting
program Healthy Start, which was intended to reduce child abuse
(perhaps the greatest social cause of criminality), close supervision of
juvenile offenders and guidance programs for youths at risk of falling
to
crime.
But over the last three decades, rather than seeking a balance, the
American approach has become almost entirely punitive: we have the
second-highest rate of incarceration in the world (after Russia), and are
the only prominent Western democracy with the death penalty.
Nonetheless, we still have one of the highest rates of criminal activity
and
violence in the world, even after taking into account the dramatic recent
declines in overall crime rates.
Nearly all criminologists consider our punitive approach a disaster. There
is no evidence that it has had any long-term impact on reducing crime,
and it is certain that excessive incarceration makes career criminals of
many of the nonviolent offenders whom we throw together with
hardened, violent ones.
Why have we taken
this contradictory punitive course? Why do nearly all
of our leaders,
including the ostensibly moderate Democratic front runner
in the presidential
race, Al Gore, trumpet their "toughness" on crime and
defense of the
death penalty?
The easy argument
is that Americans are simply prone to violence as a
people. However,
there might be a better, and far less ignoble, reason:
our extreme commitment to antipaternalism, to the principle that the state
should avoid telling citizens how to lead their lives. In the
words of the
Supreme Court
Justice Robert H. Jackson, "It is not the function of
government to
keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of
the citizen
to keep the government from falling into error."
Crime prevention
measures that are proved to work well -- from
programs aimed
at youths at risk to therapy and rehabilitation for
offenders both
in prison and after release -- are all in some way
paternalistic.
It is not just conservatives and tax cutters who resent such
programs. They
often cause animosity in the very people they are
supposed to
help. Very often these are poor people and members of
racial minorities
whose sense of freedom and dignity leads them to reject
such programs.
(In a similar way, studies of the remaking of welfare in
recent years
found a widespread and deeply felt dislike of the social
services system
and its agents on the part of welfare recipients
themselves.)
Our
rejection of a preventive approach, however, creates a paradox in
that we are forced to surrender more and more of our liberty to the
increasingly powerful police operations, like the street crimes unit in
New
York, and the draconian laws we pass in order to guarantee safety.
Unlimited power
always corrupts, and when a police officer can defend
himself against
the killing of an unarmed civilian with the nearly
unassailable
argument that he feared for his own life, we are edging closer
to unlimited
power.
In
pursuing the principle of noninterference, we are eroding the principle
of doing anything we please without being blasted away by jittery agents
of the state. New York is not alone. The police corruption scandal in Los
Angeles, the erroneous death penalty verdicts in Illinois, the F.B.I.
scandal in Boston and the execution spree in Texas are all of a piece with
this national contradiction.
As for the principle
of equality under the law, nobody can deny that the
probability
of having our liberty violated by the police is directly related
to wealth and
status. Not only are wealthy Americans treated with
greater respect
by the police, but they are also less likely to be arrested
and indicted
than poor Americans for similar acts, are less likely to be
found guilty
if they are indicted, are less likely to be incarcerated if they
are convicted
and are likely to serve less time if incarcerated. What for a
suburban white
youth is a misdemeanor powder cocaine offense
punishable by
probation becomes for a Hispanic or African-American
crack user a
15-year prison sentence.
Domestically,
the penalty we now pay for our unequal and punitive
system of justice
is the self-contradiction of our most basic liberties. As
Thoreau put
it: "Whatever the human law may be, neither an individual
nor a nation
can commit the least act of injustice against the obscurest
individual without
having to pay the penalty for it." One result of the
unequal impact
of our law-and-order stance is a deep distrust for
authorities
on the part of poorer citizens of all ethnic groups -- from white
chauvinists
who decry the Waco disaster to African-Americans outraged
over the Diallo
shooting and the beatings of Rodney King and Abner
Louima.
And there may
be an international price to pay as well. Coincidentally,
just hours before
the Diallo verdict, the State Department released its
annual report
on human rights violations, in which we condemned such
countries as
China and Pakistan for violating basic freedoms. For all of
our failures
and contradictions, we can still justly claim to be the land
most passionately
committed to the cause of liberty.
But the Diallo
trial and similar instances of growing police powers, along
with our irrational
penal system and the unequal application of our
increasingly
harsh laws, compromise our international status and
undermine the
credibility of the nation best qualified to lead the world into
a century of
global freedom.
Orlando Patterson
is a professor of sociology at Harvard and the
author of "Rituals
of Blood: Consequences of Slavery in Two
American Centuries,"
the second volume of a trilogy on race
relations.