Gates Book Offers a Study in Contrasts
By JOEL BRINKLEY
ASHINGTON -- Which is the real Bill Gates?
Is it the author who insists,
in his new book, "Business the Speed of Thought," that all interoffice
communications should flow
"over e-mail so workers can act on news with reflex-like speed" -- adding
that
meetings should not be "used
to present information" because "it's more efficient to use e-mail"?
Or is it the witness who
testified in the government's antitrust case against his
company that he could not
remember dozens of e-mail messages he wrote or
received in recent years,
dismissing one long internal message full of market data,
by saying "I don't know
what we're talking about" and "I mean, who knows?"
Bill Gates, chairman of Microsoft
Corp., never mentions the antitrust trial in the
470-page book, which his
publisher, Warner Books, a unit of Time Warner Inc.,
will begin selling next
week. It is a treatise on a favorite theme, the notion that just
about every corporate problem
can be helped if not solved with the right
hardware and software, or
"digital infrastructure."
Gates speaks of a "digital
nervous system" and "living the Web lifestyle" --
phrases that many Microsoft
employees repeat in conversation like the favored
sayings of Chairman Mao.
So it is probably true that the voluble, enthusiastic
Gates selling his vision
in this book more closely approximates the man than the
guarded, argumentative and
poorly informed defense witness.
The difference might have
proved damaging to Microsoft, since it could be perceived as undermining
the
credibility of Gates' testimony.
But it appears that damage is already done. Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson,
who is hearing the case
in U.S. District Court, has already said he does not consider Gates an
effective
witness.
While the antitrust suit
being pressed by the federal government and 19 states is not alluded to
even obliquely
in this book, many of Gates'
ideas and assertions do collide with parts of Microsoft's defense in court.
For example, throughout the
book, Gates describes how he has pushed Microsoft employees to do absolutely
everything on line, practically
banishing paper. He demanded a few years ago to be shown every paper form
in
use at Microsoft and then
promptly banned most of them.
"As this book goes to press,"
he writes, "we have reduced the number of paper forms from more than 1,000
to a company-wide total
of 60 forms."
When the blueprint for an
office building on Microsoft's campus could not be located immediately,
Gates
recalls, he insisted that
every blueprint and related paper for every structure Microsoft owns be
digitized and
made available on line.
He argues forcefully that
a key to success is placing all sales and marketing data on a company's
intranet so
everyone can see and use
it. "There's incredible value in letting everybody involved with a product,
even the
most junior team member,
understand the history, the pricing. They should be seeing their sales
numbers,
expense breakdown, vendor
and contractor costs and the status of major projects on line.
"Knowing your numbers is a fundamental precept of business."
How, then, to explain the
testimony of a key Microsoft witness, Richard L. Schmalensee, dean of the
Sloan
School of Management at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, when asked if he had made any
attempt
to determine from the company's
records "how much of Microsoft's reported profits come from operating
systems."
Schmalensee answered: "I
was surprised, but I will be honest with you, the state of Microsoft's
internal
accounting systems do not
always rise to the level of sophistication one might expect from a firm
as
successful as it is. They
record operating system sales by hand, on sheets of paper."
Schmalensee may get an opportunity
to address this seeming contradiction; he is expected to be one of the
rebuttal witnesses Microsoft
calls when the trial resumes next month.
Gates does offer a detailed
narrative of his company's long road to the Internet, a
story that dovetails with
Microsoft's presentations on the subject in court but that
government lawyers dispute.
"In 1993, we were not focused
on the Internet," he writes. "It was a fifth or sixth
priority." The only Internet
presence at Microsoft then, he recalls, was a
demonstration set up on
a folding table in an office hallway, "with handwritten
instructions" and cables
held in place with duct tape.
But several junior employees
hectored him and other executives to pay attention, he
writes; by the spring of
1994, after many meetings, he announced in an e-mail to his
staff, "We are going to
make a big bet on the Internet."
Significantly, that was only
two days after Netscape Communications Corp. had
been founded. The government
charges that a key motivation for Microsoft's Internet
strategy was to undermine
Netscape, the most important competitor in what was then
an infant market. In particular,
the government contends that Microsoft decided to bundle the Internet
Explorer, its Web browser
software, with the Windows operating system to gain competitive advantage.
Part of Microsoft's current
strategy to counter that charge is to stop using the word "browser." At
Microsoft,
it seems, the word is banned.
Internet Explorer is not a browser at all, company executives say. It is
a package
of "Web browsing technologies"
that is part of Windows.
At Gates' deposition, government
lawyers questioned him about this, asking, "Is there an effort on your
part
or, insofar as you are aware,
on other people's parts, to change the way words are used" as a means of
advancing Microsoft's case?
He gave no clear answer.
Occasionally executives do
slip and utter the B word. Among them is Gates. On page 163, he notes that,
after
years of lagging in Internet
software and services, "now we lead in several major Internet areas and
have a
growing number of people
using our browser."