September 11, 2001 - NY Times

          The Broken-Windows Myth

          By BERNARD E. HARCOURT

              CAMBRIDGE, Mass. -- Whatever the outcome of
               today's mayoral primary, there is already at least
          one clear winner: the notion that New York City's
          remarkable drop in crime can be sustained only by
          continuing the Giuliani administration's crackdown on
          quality-of-life offenses.

          This "broken windows" theory — the idea that tolerating
          minor infractions like graffiti, aggressive panhandling and
          turnstile jumping encourages more serious crimes by
          sending a signal that the community is not in control — has
          been endorsed in some form by all the candidates. Some
          have expressed concern that the police under Mayor
          Rudolph W. Giuliani have not paid enough attention to
          civil liberties. But what they have missed is that this style
          of policing leads to the violations of personal rights that
          they denounce. And what voters have missed is a real
          debate on crime and policing, as each candidate jockeys
          to be the next Rudy Giuliani on crime.

          There is little, if any, evidence that the crackdown on
          squeegee men and graffiti scribblers has played much of a
          role in reducing crime in New York. Since the early
          1990's, most major American cities have seen their crime
          rates drop significantly, in some cases even further than
          New York's has. Many of these cities did not undertake
          anything like New York's crackdown on small-time
          offenses.

          A 1999 study of the 17 largest cities compared each city's
          most recent drop in homicides. New York's rate of decline
          was the fifth-largest, behind those of San Diego,
          Washington, St. Louis and Houston.

          San Diego, seated along a major drug smuggling corridor
          close to the Mexican border, is particularly interesting. In
          the late 1980's, its police department began adopting a
          very different style — a problem-solving,
          community-oriented approach. While recording
          impressive drops in crime between 1993 and 1996, the
          city also posted a 15 percent drop in arrests and an 8
          percent decline in complaints of police misconduct.

          Criminologists say a number of other factors have
          contributed to declining crime rates in New York —
          among them, the sharp increase in the police force. Former
          Mayor David Dinkins hired more than 2,000 new police
          officers, and Mr. Giuliani hired another 4,000. From 1991
          to 1998 the force grew by almost a quarter, giving New
          York the highest ratio of officers per civilian of the
          nation's large cities.

          A fall in the crack cocaine trade, a strong economy, new
          computerized police tracking systems, more prisoners and
          an aging population have also contributed to lower crime
          rates.

          The best social-scientific evidence has shown that a
          neighborhood's graffiti, litter or public drunks do not
          necessarily point to a serious crime problem. The
          research suggests that rather than leading to serious crime,
          disorder — like crime — is caused by conditions like
          poverty and a lack of trust between neighbors.

          The most rigorous research to date, a 1999 study by
          Robert Sampson of the University of Chicago and Stephen
          Raudenbush of the University of Michigan, concludes that
          "the current fascination in policy circles on cleaning up
          disorder through law enforcement techniques appears
          simplistic and largely misplaced, at least in terms of
          directly fighting crime."

          Whatever effect the quality-of-life campaign has had on
          serious crime in New York is, in all likelihood, not a
          result of fixing broken windows or cleaning the city of
          squeegee men. It is because of the increased surveillance
          afforded by Giuliani-style policing. The broken-windows
          policy has made possible a 66 percent jump in
          misdemeanor arrests from 1993 to 1998 and sharp
          increases in stop-and-frisks that allow more searches for
          guns, more checks for outstanding warrants and more
          fingerprint collection.

          This enhanced surveillance has come with a big price tag:
          a 37 percent increase in complaints of police misconduct
          from 1993 to 1999, significant racial disparities in
          enforcement, illegal strip searches and many traumatic
          encounters — some of them deadly — for ordinary
          citizens. It has also aggravated racial divisions.

          So do we need a broken-windows type of policing? Not
          for combating serious crime. This approach to law
          enforcement diminishes trust between the police and the
          community, violates basic rights and scapegoats the
          homeless and other people we deem disorderly. Clearly,
          there still needs to be a mayoral debate on whether New
          York City wants to bear that cost.

          Bernard E. Harcourt is a professor of law at the University
          of Arizona and the author of "Illusion of Order: The False
          Promise of Broken Windows Policing."